Recycling European Narratives in South Korea’s ‘Refugee Crisis’: Islamophobia, #MeToo, and Yemeni Refugees on Jeju Island by Sheikh, Farrah
© Farrah Sheikh, 2021 | doi:10.1163/22142312-bja10015
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.
Asiascape: Digital Asia 8 (2021) 211–239
brill.com/dias
Recycling European Narratives in South Korea’s 
‘Refugee Crisis’: Islamophobia, #MeToo, and  
Yemeni Refugees on Jeju Island
Farrah Sheikh | ORCID: 0000-0001-9637-7889
Research Associate, Centre of Islamic Studies,  
SOAS University of London, London, UK
drfarrahsheikh@gmail.com
Abstract
2018 was a politically tempestuous time for South Korea as a little over 500, mostly 
male, Yemeni asylum-seekers landed on Korea’s Jeju Island. Their unexpected arrival 
caught Korean society, already in the midst of its own #MeToo wave off guard, resulting 
in a wave of pro- and anti-refugee demonstrations across the country. Fueled by real 
and fake news about refugee illegal activities in Europe, anti-refugee backlash in Korea 
took an Islamophobic and feminist tone. Based on digital ethnography, this article 
presents observations from online voices – refugees, feminists, and media actors – 
expressed through Naver News and Naver Cafes to assess the ways in which Korea’s 
refugee crisis was represented in local and global anti-refugee and Islamophobic nar-
ratives, aimed in particular at Muslim men. This research highlights the impact of 
European narratives on Korean society and raises questions over how Korean society 
can create a wider, inclusive digital democracy.
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1 Introduction
This article offers critical reflections on the intersections between Islamo-
phobia, anti-refugee sentiments, and feminist solidarities in contemporary 
South Korean society within the context of widespread anti-refugee and 
#MeToo demonstrations held in the summer of 2018. To this end, this article 
explores the following research questions. First, what are the connections 
between the anti-refugee and women’s movement in Korean society? Second, 
what is the relationship between Korea and Europe in the context of refugee 
representation online? Third, what does Korea’s response to the refugee crisis 
tell us about current race-gender dynamics in Korean society?
To address these research questions, this article examines digital voices: 
refugee, radical feminist, media, and right-wing discourse expressed in Naver 
News and Naver Cafés to assess the ways in which Korea’s refugee crisis was repre-
sented in local and global anti-refugee and Islamophobic narratives, particularly 
those directed at Muslim men. In doing so, this research offers several novel 
insights. First, the geographic focus on South Korea contributes an important 
set of considerations around the inter-play between anti-refugee sentiments, 
feminism, and Islamophobia in a relatively under-researched context. Second, 
this research highlights the impact of neo-colonial European narratives on 
Korean society and raises questions over how it can create a wider, inclusive 
digital democracy.
Internet-based technologies enable discussion between people at oppo-
site ends of the planet and yet also fragment political discourse (Papacharissi 
2002). Further, Papacharissi argues that the internet and its related technolo-
gies have created new public spaces for politically orientated conversations, 
which creates a framework for our exploration of online discourses about 
Yemeni refugees, women’s concerns, #MeToo, and Islamophobic exclusion 
in South Korea’s main communication outlets, Naver News and Naver Cafés. 
Unlike platforms such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter, which are popular in 
Western settings (Fuchs 2015), South Korea uses advanced digital platforms, 
which are particularly suited for smartphone use, including Naver, Kakao (pre-
viously Daum), and Zum (Jin 2017). Naver has considerable dominance in the 
South Korean market and is recognized as the most popular internet portal 
in Korea since it was launched in 1999 (Park et al. 2007). Its share of Korea’s 
search engine market is 83.7 percent, followed by Daum (13.65%), Zum (1.05%) 
and Google (0.9%) (Jin 2017).
The main drivers of public communication related to politics with the 
potential to stimulate transnational discourses are conflicts and crises 
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(Karatzogianni 2006). Amplifying this position further, Karatzogianni argues 
that online media can magnify the formation of border-transcending com-
munication, and the internet has played a fundamental role in this process. 
They form part of the essential framework for this research, as shown in the 
different conversations, postings, and news stories that created a transnational 
‘web sphere’ (Schneider & Foot 2006) between East and West in terms of the 
formation, propagation, debate, fact checking, and public opinion on refugees 
and, more pertinently, anti-refugee discourse in the South Korean context. The 
internet functions as a tool for producing and sharing political information as 
well as space for the materialization of expansive contexts (Nguyen 2016). This 
article demonstrates that individuals in one specific Naver Café engaged with 
transnationally sourced fake and biased news, mostly from European sources, 
highlighting the impact of neo-colonial narratives on the ways in which 500 
Yemeni male Muslim refugee arrivals were received, framed, and eventually 
produced through Islamophobic discourses aimed at curtailing their human 
rights, based in part on alarmist concerns about the safety of Korean women.
2 2018, a Summer of Discontent: Korea’s ‘Refugee Crisis’ and the 
Ongoing Battle for Women’s Rights through #MeToo
2.1 Arriving in Korean Territory
In the summer of 2018, approximately 500 Yemeni, mostly male, asylum seek-
ers found a pathway for legal entry to one of the few East Asian signatories to 
the Geneva Convention, South Korea, where they could apply for asylum and 
refugee status (Foreign Policy 2018, Sheikh 2019).
This group of Yemeni asylum seekers travelled to Korea in a last-ditch 
attempt to find safety in the region, as many were already in nearby Malaysia, 
a Muslim-majority Asian country that granted them tourist visas with no right 
to work or settle. As Malaysia is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention, it 
was impossible for Yemenis to apply for asylum, and they were forced to leave, 
seeking alternative routes to safety. In a fortunate coincidence, Korea wanted 
to capitalize on the popularity of its cultural products across Southeast Asia 
(also known as the Korean Wave, or Hallyu) and open up direct flights between 
Malaysia and Jeju Island, a special zone where the majority of people in the 
world can enter Korean territory visa-free. This opened up a small and legal 
window for Yemenis who could afford to purchase airplane tickets and enter 
the only nearby country in the region that would accept their passports and 
process asylum applications in line with the Convention.
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2.2 Unexpected Alliances and Hostile Reactions to Yemeni Refugees
After they arrived, the Yemenis were caught off-guard by their hostile recep-
tion, starting with local Jeju Islanders and rapidly extending to the rest of the 
country, as a powerful anti-refugee movement took root and spread across 
Korea. One of the central driving forces behind this backlash was a call to pro-
tect Korean women from potential violence by Muslim men. The notion that 
Muslim men are prone to terrorism, sexual violence, crime, and delinquency 
is not limited to the Korean context, which has a long history of such fears, 
rooted in Western, Orientalist conceptions of Muslim men (see Abu-Lughod 
2003; Baker et al. 2013; Dwyer et al. 2008; Hopkins 2009; Said 1981). Many of 
these negative stereotypes were repeated in media coverage of the European 
refugee crisis in 2015, when approximately 1.5 million Syrian and other asylum 
seekers went to Europe in search of safety and shelter (Walker & Gajjala 2016). 
The issue of Muslim men as potential or actual sex criminals was reported 
widely in European media, in particular some inflammatory incidents in 
Germany and Sweden. Many cases were later discovered to be fake or distorted 
(Spiegel International 2018), but by then the stories had already circulated 
around the world, including Korea, where they helped to facilitate negative 
framings of Muslim men, especially those who were refugees, with significant 
consequences for these Yemeni refugees (Park 2018).
Young women in Korea expressed the highest levels of fear and concern 
about their safety in relation to the arrival of male Muslim refugees in the 
country. As highlighted in previous scholarship and supported by the results of 
the present study, the arrival of this group reinforced violent stereotypes that 
depict Muslim men as potential sex offenders, terrorists, and criminals, based 
on real and fake news circulating online (Park 2018). This imagined risk pro-
pelled some young Korean women to define themselves as ‘feminist’, and they 
allied with anti-refugee activists to build an unlikely coalition of resistance 
(Choi & Park 2020). Popular hashtags included ‘Rapefugees’, ‘Secure Safety 
Rights for Jeju Women’, and ‘Refugees Threaten Women’ further conflating 
women’s concerns and anti-refugee rhetoric in Korean online spaces. These 
alliances served as a catalyst within local feminist circles, leading to animated 
discussions about the meaning of ‘feminist’, about feminism ‘without borders’, 
and what it means to be hospitable (Kim et al. 2019). Furthermore, the schism 
between radical and traditional feminists that emerged because of opposing 
views on the Yemeni refugee issue was also highlighted in data by Hankook 
researchers (Jeong and Lee 2021), suggesting that although the radical femi-
nist perspective was a highly represented and a vocal part of the anti-refugee 
discourse, these radical views do not full represent the spectrum of feminist 
thought in Korea.
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To contextualise the Korean case further, it is important to understand the 
wider political and social climate at this particular moment. Before the anti-
refugee movement, several earlier protests had been held, demanding better 
protection for women, especially against sexual violence, eventually giving 
rise to an indigenous #MeToo/#WithYou movement. #MeToo in Korea is not 
something new. It has roots in a much longer, ongoing battle against patri-
archal norms and sexual violence arguably ignited by Kim Hak-soon’s brave 
testimony in August 1991, about her experience with sexual slavery due to the 
Japanese military. After 50 years of silence, Kim was the first former ‘comfort 
woman’ to testify about her horrific experiences (Hasunuma & Shin 2019). Her 
courage and determination opened the door for other women to speak out 
(Allen 2005), with contemporary battles against sexual violence, including 
protests against the practice of molka, calls to legalize abortion, and #MeToo.1
In Korea, #MeToo was sparked by a televised interview of Prosecutor Seo 
Ji-hyun, an influential woman who revealed that she had suffered sexual abuse 
in the workplace at the hands of a senior colleague and even faced demotion 
after attempting to make a formal complaint. Seo stated that this experience 
had encouraged her to take the abuser to court, and, even more powerfully, she 
reminded Korean women that they were not to blame for their own abuse by 
such men.
This extraordinary case touched the hearts of many Korean women, and 
they began to pour out into the streets to protest and once again to call for real 
change. Against this backdrop, the unexpected arrival of 500 Muslim asylum 
seekers, mostly male and from a little-known country with an unfamiliar reli-
gion, sparked another round of fear in some feminist quarters. These groups 
quickly galvanized support for their anti-refugee stance, finding support in alli-
ances with far-right Christian and anti-multiculturalist groups. It is important 
to support the battle for women’s rights, echoing the voices of several pro-
refugee feminist scholars in the field. At the same time, it is a matter of grave 
concern that many Korean feminists expressed fear about women’s safety, in 
particular the risk of sexual violence posed specifically by Muslim men based 
on fake and biased news, spreading this message online and in the street 
(Park 2018).
In light of this, several feminist scholars and activists in Korea came together 
to illustrate the content of this fake news, which broadly claimed that Yemenis 
were from a Muslim country that allowed the rape and abuse of women (Kim 
2019). This claim led Jeju locals to use online Naver cafés to question whether 
1 Molka are secret cameras hidden in public toilets, hotel rooms, and changing rooms at stores, 
which film women in intimate situations and upload content for sale on the internet.
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their daughters could be raised safely among such men. They also spread fake 
news about Yemeni Muslim practices, such as the allegation that they used 
female genital mutilation (FGM) as a form of sexual violence. Thereafter, 
FGM was highlighted as a major issue, becoming a source of Korean disdain 
toward Yemeni asylum seekers (Young 2019), along with fears of other sexual 
crimes, such as rape, and a belief that cultural differences between Korean and 
Muslim societies are irreconcilable. With tensions running high, mounting 
rage over sexual violence against women that was already prevalent in Korean 
society was extended to these Yemeni arrivals because they were Muslim men, 
blurring the line between the need to protect women and refugee rights and, 
ironically, using the language of #MeToo to persecute asylum seekers based on 
their gender.
Korea’s anti-refugee movement was composed of a wide coalition of voices, 
most prominently feminists (concerned about male-perpetrated violence against 
Korean women and those who were in favour of receiving refugees), right-
wing and right-wing Christian groups (concerned about the spread of Islam 
in Korea through these asylum seekers), and anti-multiculturalists, who hold 
long-standing grievances over immigration, globalization, and the presence 
of Muslims in Korea, in firm opposition of its imminent multicultural future. 
Korea’s rejection of refugees is rooted at least in part in existing anti-multicultural 
discourse mostly found in online forums, including membership-based cafés, 
highlighting the unexpected solidarity that emerged among these groups as 
something that needs to be explored in analyzing the anti-refugee movement 
in Korea (Jun 2019, 2020). This collective opposition to Yemeni refugees was 
heavily based on ill-informed assumptions about Muslims and Islam, fake and 
biased news, especially from Europe, and outright Islamophobic sentiments 
circulated and discussed online.
In sum, as the government failed to mobilize a swift response, new Yemeni 
arrivals who were desperately seeking safety in Korea found themselves 
sleeping on the street or crammed in hotel rooms, struggling for food and 
basic necessities, and quickly running out of resources while simultaneously 
embroiled in public debates about sexual violence, terrorism, and women’s 
safety in an unfamiliar society.
In the language of feminism and women’s protection, Yemeni asylum 
seekers were painted as Others to be feared. The backlash took on a specific 
Islamophobic and feminist shape based on Orientalist tropes that framed these 
men not only as potential terrorists and sex criminals but also as coming from 
a culture perceived as incompatible with Korean society. This backlash was 
channelled through online activism across social media platforms, including 
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Twitter and Naver, women-related fears captured in the trending hashtag 
Secure Safety Rights for Jeju Women (제주도여성안전권보장하라). Reams 
of fake and biased news were posted, discussed, and translated from original 
English-language sources into Korean as it spread across Naver Café forums 
(one of which is discussed in detail later) and shared through the Naver News 
portal. Another source of anti-refugee digital activism was fake and negative 
news about the way that Europe managed its Syrian refugee crisis in 2015. The 
circulation of these stories led to the development of peculiar protest slogans, 
such as ‘We don’t want to be like Europe’ and ‘Kick out fake refugees’, at the 
same time as issues of Korean women’s safety were being raised.
On the surface, these negative responses are noteworthy, given that Korea 
has short historical memories of its interactions with Muslims and has no 
record of Muslim-perpetrated violence in its contemporary history. Moreover, 
Korea depends on wealthy Muslim-majority countries for oil supplies, con-
struction contracts, trade, and other economic activity (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2021). These 500 Yemeni asylum seekers were not the first Muslim 
refugees to settle in South Korea, though it has one of the lowest rates in the 
world of refugee acceptance: in 2018, its rate was approximately 3.2 percent, 
resulting in 2,903 successful applications, and in 2019 this number increased 
to 3,215 (Macrotrends 2020). Other waves of refugees from Yemen and Syria 
have settled in Korea without facing this type of violent nationwide opposi-
tion. This reaction indicates the profound impact of news, whether genuine 
or fake, that is spread, unquestioned, and permitted to shape negative percep-
tions that feed into global discourses filled with Islamophobia and anti-refugee 
sentiments, particularly online.
3 Methodology
3.1 Overview of Methods
This multi-layered ethnography is built with digital ethnographic methods. 
The primary online field site was Naver, Korea’s media giant. The ways in which 
refugee and women’s issues were discussed in Naver Cafés and represented 
on Naver News (a news aggregator) have some subtle differences, so before 
offering deeper observational insights into one specific group on Naver Café, 
Refugee Countermeasures National Action, I first explore general differences 
between the two discourses. Using this type of approach enabled me to access 
spaces – particularly right-wing, Korean-language discourse – in the digital 
sphere that would otherwise have been inaccessible to a non-Korean, Muslim 
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female researcher of colour. Although the collection of online news stories 
does not involve any access issues, full access to the Naver Café under investi-
gation here is restricted to registered members, who must be screened by Café 
administrators and are often asked to make a financial or offline contribu-
tion to the movement (e.g. by attending meetings or organizing street rallies). 
Naturally, this meant that being a non-Korean, British-Pakistani Muslim, 
who uses Korean as a third language created several barriers to obtaining full 
access. So, it became necessary to consider the ethical issues and compromises 
involved in my method of data collection, which inevitably required some 
covert observations.
Covert research is clearly distinct from deceptive research, with the former 
defined as research that is not fully disclosed to the target. However, deceptive 
research is understood as when researchers actively misrepresent themselves 
or their actions to those whom they are observing, often risking a breach of 
trust, privacy, and rights (Spicker 2011). Part of my research is ‘covert’ in the 
sense of observing posts on an online forum where all discussions are pub-
licly visible by choice and participants use pseudonymous screen names. 
I believe this is analogous to researchers who are standing near people in pub-
lic and observing their behaviour, such as motorists who are checking their 
mobile phones (Walker et al. 2006). Taking care to differentiate between con-
tent behind a password-protected wall – a ‘zone of protected activity’ (Faden 
& Beauchamp 1986) – and what was freely accessible without passwords or 
registration, I limited my data collection strictly to open postings that were 
publicly available. The issue of covert online data collection is a source of 
debate among internet researchers (see also Herrera 1999; Homan 1991), but 
I believe this approach strikes a balance between data collection, anonymity, 
consent, and ethical research standards while protecting myself in the field 
through limited, one-way interaction.
After collecting a representative sample, I then translated the posts from 
Korean into English or located and used the original English-language versions 
of news articles that were circulating and discussed in the café. This layered 
approach to the digital field enabled me to offer insights into the conversations 
taking place about feminism, refugees, and Muslims in Korea in the summer 
of 2018.
As displayed in Figure 1, this approach revealed the different priorities in 
online discourse around refugees and women’s issues even though, overall, the 
two discussions focused on many of the same issues.
This way of working enabled insights into communities, public opinion, and 
debates that are often absent from wider, global discussions on refugee issues, 
which are usually dominated by European and American contexts.
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4 The Fieldwork
4.1 Data Mining Naver Using Textom
Naver offers a wide range of digital lifestyle services as well as access to news 
and media. In general, it is divided into Naver News, Naver Blogs, and Naver 
Cafés, with the latter functioning as online discussion forums. It is widely 
acknowledged as one of the most popular blogging sites in Korea (Jia et al. 2014; 
Park & Thelwall 2008). The internet has allowed the formation of virtual com-
munities, particularly forums and chatrooms as well as the ability to engage 
with them despite differences across time and space (Dicks 2005). As Table 1 
shows, based on a maximum 1,000 available pieces of data sampled randomly 
with data-mining software called Textom, Naver Cafés produced slightly more 
content related to refugee issues than the mainstream media portal, Naver 
News, revealing the weight of public opinion shared through forums.
Because of the significance of Naver in Korea, Naver Cafés are an impor-
tant digital space, influencing public opinion and helping to shape the overall 
anti-refugee movement. I used Textom, an online data collection application 
designed for the Korean market that can handle Korean-language content and 
can specifically crawl spaces such as Naver. It returns a maximum of 1,000 
pieces of available data per search term. I created my initial dataset based on 
keywords and terms most frequently used in news articles and café posts about 
the Yemeni refugee crisis in 2018–2019, taking particular note of any trending 
hashtags.2
2 Most of the online data was collected in Korean, translated into English by the author where 
necessary.
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As expected, data mining across all available Naver Cafés resulted in several 
influential forums involved in the shaping of online discourse about refugees 
and women. For a focused and in-depth investigation, based on this ini-
tial finding, I selected one café, ‘Refugee Countermeasures National Action’ 
for observation, based not only on their online activities but also on their 
powerful offline presence, as café members organized offline, anti-refugee 
demonstrations, street rallies as well as creating hateful online content. This 
café’s discourse had real-life consequences for Yemeni asylum seekers, as dis-
cussed below.
4.2 Data Analysis
My findings were analyzed using a two-pronged approach. Based on word fre-
quencies, I used Textom to source data, outlining the top 20–35 word pairs 
across Naver News and Naver Cafés in 2018 related to refugee and women’s 
issues. Next, I used the qualitative software package Nvivo 12 to code and orga-
nize my digital observations of the group Refugee Countermeasures National 
Action on Naver Café. Employing thematic analysis, which highlighted rela-
tionships and themes between various collected discourses, paired well with 
the word frequency data yielded from Textom. This complex analytical process 
enabled me to present a vivid and nuanced picture of Korean society’s reac-
tions to the arrival of 500 Yemeni asylum seekers fleeing war and terror using 
various modes of digital representation.
Table 1 Research keyword searches
English Korean No. of café 
search results
No. of news 
articles
Refugee Problem 난민문제 1,000 911
Jeju Refugees 제주도난민 1,000 872
Yemen Refugees 예멘난민 1,000 789





Missing Jeju Women 제주도여성실종사건 215 359
Jeju Women 제주도여성 1,000 950
Islam Refugees 이슬람난민 1,000 957
Muslim Refugees 무슬림 난민 1,000 969
Fake Refugees 가짜난민 1,000 883
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5 Exploring the Data
As referred to in the section above on methodology, the data were collected 
through mining and digital observations to explore the links between online 
discourse and realities on the ground to communicate the relationship 
between Korea’s #MeToo movement, Islamophobic opposition to Yemeni refu-
gees, and the influence of European narratives on Korea’s refugee discourse. 
This enables the presentation of a comprehensive account of the various nar-
ratives and sources of information that generated strong opposition to the 
arrival of Yemeni refugees in Korea.
As expected, the text-mining exercise returned a significant amount of 
data for Naver News and Naver Cafés. Making sense of it required organizing 
the results into word pairs for these two searches, and then the top 30 words 
used most often in relation to my other keyword searches were recorded. This 
approach facilitated cutting across the data to map out the actual foundations 
of anti-refugee discourse in the Korean context, offering insights into the core 
concerns and the formation of a broad overview of events that took place 
online. It also paves the way for the next step of analysis: understanding the 
inner workings of the Refugee Countermeasures group, chosen as an influen-
tial and representative sample of the discourse found across Naver News and 
Naver Cafés. The next section offers reflections on the connections between 
the datasets, revealing the essential sources and components of anti-refugee 
discourse specifically targeted at Yemeni refugees in 2018 and how it was chan-
nelled through a range of concerns, particularly violence against women and 
Islamophobic sentiments.
6 Mapping out Anti-Yemeni Refugee Discourse in Korea
6.1 Word Frequency: Naver News 2018
The data yielded from Naver News highlights important components of 
anti-refugee discourse online. Tables 2 and 3 list the top 20–35 word pairs cor-
responding to specific events that took place in Korea, which formed part of 
the anti-refugee movement or reflect links between Korean and European 
anti-refugee discourses.
First, the word pair ‘fake/refugees’ is used as an indication of the debates 
that took place over the motives behind the arrival of Yemeni refugees in 
Korea, questioning whether they were truly refugees or migrants seeking eco-
nomic opportunities. These assumptions and accusations were also levied at 
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refugees who went to European territories en masse in 2015, when the media 
framed many of the new arrivals as ‘migrants’ or ‘economic migrants’ (Walker 
& Gajjala 2016).
Table 2 Word frequency results for Naver News
Word pairs (English) Word pairs (Korean) Frequency
1 Yemen Refugees 예멘 난민 305
2 Fake Refugees 가짜 난민 282
3 Sojourn Permission 체류 허가 256
4 Refugee Acknowledgement 난민 인정 232
5 Refugee Law Abolish 난민법 폐지 219
6 Refugee Problem 난민 문제 200
7 Jeju Refugees 제주 예멘 178
8 Blue House National Petition 청와대 국민청원 156
9 Refugee Acceptance 난민 수용 127
10 Refugee Application 난민 신청 134
11 Visa-Free Entry 무사증 입국 125
12 Seoul Jongnoro 서울 종로구 112
13 Jeju Refugees Refugee Application 제주예멘 난민신청 88
14 Refugee Crime 난민 범죄 88
15 By Refugee law Visa Free 따른난민법 무사증 87
16 Refugee Against 난민반 대 87
17 Visa-Free Jeju 무사증 제도 87
18 Merkel President 메르켈 총리 85
19 Christian Conversion 기독교 개종 84
20 Refugee Application Abolish 난민신청허 폐지 82
21 Refugee Law Amendment 난민법 개정 81
22 Refugee 
Countermeasures
National Action 난민대책 국민행동 80
23 Missing Event 실종 사건 79
24 Enter Country Refugee Application 
Permit
입국 난민신청허 78
25 Constitutional Petition 개헌 청원 74
26 Jeju Island Yemen 제주도 예멘 71
27 National Petition Notice board 국민청원 게시판 68
28 Jeju Island Abolish 제도 폐지 65
29 Refugee Acceptance Against 난민수 반대 63
30 Simple Disapproval 단순 불인정 61
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Second, Korea was the only country that signed the Geneva Convention in 
the region, that was accessible to Yemeni passport-holders, and much of the 
Korean news coverage was about ‘acknowledging’ Yemeni arrivals as formal 
refugees. Heated debates took place over repealing the ‘refugee law’ – or, in 
other words, withdrawing Korea from the Geneva Convention, despite its 
incredibly low rate of refugee acceptance. Concerns over permission to enter 
Korean territories through the visa-waiver programme designed to boost tour-
ism on Jeju Island, fake refugees, and the risk of violence aimed in particular 
at women eventually led to a national petition submitted to the Blue House 
with the highest number of signatures demanding strong action on a domestic 
online petition to date. This is also an important indicator of the discourse as it 
relates to #MeToo issues and concerns over violence against women.
Third, the word pair ‘Seoul/Jongnoro’ refers to the locations of anti-refugee 
street demonstrations in the summer of 2018, many led by young people, espe-
cially women, holding up placards that demanded safety for Koreans and that 
‘fake’ refugees ‘go home’ (Park 2018).
The links between Korea and Europe in terms of anti-refugee discourse are 
further highlighted by the word pair ‘Merkel/President’. Online discussions 
debated the risks of the German chancellor’s decision to open the country’s 
border to refugees and the potential implications of such a decision in the 
Korean context. Fake and distorted news about incidents of mass sexual vio-
lence that took place in Cologne in 2015, and the perception that the overall rise 
in sexual crime rates in Germany was due to male Muslim refugees (Boulila & 
Carri 2017), inspired many online activists in Korea to spread the anti-refugee 
and anti-multicultural slogan ‘we don’t want to be like Europe’. In addition 
to the warnings against ‘Muslim invasions’ or a ‘clash of civilizations’ echoed 
by extreme right-wing activists and supremacists based in Europe (Boulila 
& Carri 2017), a key concern reflected in Korean online discourse, especially 
propagated by right-wing Christian groups, was the fear that Yemenis would 
Word pairs (English) Word pairs (Korean) Frequency
31 Visa-Free Abolish 무사증 폐지 60
32 Missing Women in Their 
Thirties
실종 30대여 57
33 Oppose Rally 반대 집회 56
34 Muslim Refugees 무슬림 난민 55
Table 2 Word frequency results for Naver News (cont.)
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attempt to convert Koreans to Islam and that they would introduce Islam into 
the wider society by stealth through applications for asylum.
Lastly, ‘Missing/Event’ along with ‘Missing/Women in Their Thirties’ refers 
to several cases of women on Jeju Island who vanished, with locals initially 
holding Yemeni refugees responsible for their disappearance and, in some 
cases, even their death. As discussed below, this fake news became a hugely 
influential component of anti-refugee discourse that also made use of the lan-
guage of #MeToo to push back against the arrival of Yemenis in Korea.
6.2 Word Frequency: Naver Cafés 2018
The results of the same search across Naver Cafés demonstrates that priorities 
in the discourse were organized differently from what was portrayed in the 
news. By homing in on these differences within Naver Café, we can observe 
how refugee discourse was linked to existing and long-standing concerns about 
implementing anti-discrimination laws in Korea, along with the inaccurate per-
ception that Yemeni refugees were illegal sojourners. On the surface, these two 
issues might appear wholly disconnected. However, right-wing and conserva-
tive actors in Korea have a long history of opposition to the prospect of passing 
laws that outlaw racism and discrimination based on sex, gender, religion, and 
disability. In particular, these groups (including Refugee Countermeasures) 
perceive anti-discrimination laws as favourable to foreigners and multicul-
tural families. Therefore, the link between this ongoing debate and the word 
pair ‘illegal/sojourn’ can be understood as opposition to any attempts to curtail 
criticism levelled at immigrants – this time Yemeni refugees.
Table 3 Word frequency results for Naver Cafes
Word pairs (English) Word pairs (original Korean) Frequency
1 Illegal Sojourn 불법체류 무사증 480
2 Anti-Discrimination 
Law
Illegal Sojourn 차별금지법 불법체류 479
3 Refugee Problem Europe Situation 난민문제 유럽사태 453
4 Muslim Refugee Problem 무슬림 난민문제 426
5 Yemen Refugee 예멘 난민 227
6 Refugee Problem 난민 문제 173
7 Islam Refugee 이슬람 난민 159
8 Refugee Opposition 난민반 대 158
9 Jeju Island Refugee 제주도 난민 128
10 Fake Refugee 가짜 난민 107
11 Visa-Free Entry 무사증 입국 99
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Word pairs (English) Word pairs (original Korean) Frequency
12 Follow Refugee Law Visa-Free 따른난민법 무사증 86
13 Refugee Application 
Permission
Abolish 난민신청허 폐지 84
14 Entered Applicants 입국 난민신청허 76
15 Refugee Acceptance Oppose 난민수 반대 74
16 Refugee Acceptance 난민 수용 71
17 Refugee Law Abolish 난민법 폐지 68
18 Refugee Opposition 난민 반대 67
19 Opposition Petition 반대 청원 60
20 Jeju Island Refugee Problem 제주도 난민문제 55
21 Refugee Applicants 난민 신청 50
22 Jeju Yemen 제주 예멘 46
23 Refugee Acknowledgement 난민 인정 37
24 Refugee Jeju Island 난민 제주도 36
25 Refugees Islam 난민 이슬람 34
26 Opposition Rally 반대 집회 31
27 Jeju Island Illegal Refugees 제주도 불법난민신
청문
30
28 Visa-Free Abolish 무사증 폐지 30
29 Citizens Safety 국민 안전 27
30 Refugee Crime 난민 범죄 26
31 Islam Muslim 이슬람 무슬림 25
Table 3 Word frequency results for Naver Cafes (cont.)
The word pair ‘refugee problem/Europe situation’ is important because 
it points to the ways in which coverage of the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe 
influenced Korean opinion, especially within Naver Café discussion spaces. 
Negative coverage and fake and distorted news about refugees in Europe 
played a consistent and vital role in shaping Korean reactions to Yemeni ref-
ugees, with the local narrative quickly describing the arrival of 500 Yemenis 
as a domestic ‘refugee crisis’. Within these café forum spaces Islamophobia, 
anti-multiculturalist attitudes, and racism played out, as shown by the word 
pairs ‘Muslim/refugee problem’, ‘Yemen/refugee’, ‘Islam/refugee’, and ‘refugee/ 
opposition’. Many Naver Cafés were also spaces where members organized 
offline activities, such anti-refugee street demonstrations, which were more 
impactful in their attempts to build opposition based on Islamophobic percep-
tions than Naver News.
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This data exploration provides an overview of the essential components, 
events, narratives, and concerns expressed through Naver News and Naver 
Cafés. At first glance, it might appear that the concerns expressed in the two 
spaces are largely the same; however, the way in which the issues have been 
prioritized is very different, with Naver News stories largely connected to the 
arrival, processing, and evaluation of refugees – including concerns over 
the legitimacy of their refugee status and calls for withdrawal from the Geneva 
Convention. However, mapping out the broad discourse across Naver Cafés 
prioritizes the shape and roots of its opposition: organizing anti-refugee ral-
lies in the streets, petitions, calling for the abolition of refugee laws in Korea, 
drawing on stories from European handling of refugees, and expressing con-
cerns over the arrival of Muslims in the country. The data sets the frame for 
understanding how these broad concerns play out in the prominent group in 
Naver Café, called Refugee Countermeasures National Action, in my observa-
tions illustrating the relationship between Korea and Europe vis-à-vis refugee 
representation.
6.3 Online Observations: Refugee Countermeasures National Action
The Refugee Countermeasures National Action site was initiated on 21 June 
2018 and, at the time of writing, consisted of 7,624 members and 41,833 posts 
and had a total of 2,014,619 visitors.3 It uses the following phrases to describe 
itself – ‘Nationalism comes first! Nationals first, not people! Fake refugees/
illegal refugees! Anti-discrimination law’ – and lists the following keywords 
as its main search terms: ‘anti-refugee, refugees, refugee crime, Yemeni refu-
gees, anti-discrimination law, Islam, multicultural, illegal residents, foreigners, 
and refugee countermeasures’, which outline this forum’s main catalogue of 
concerns.
It is a highly ranked online café, reflecting the popularity of its general 
anti-foreigner discourse and, specifically, its deep concern over the arrival 
of Yemeni refugees in Korea.4 Although it requires membership to comment 
and read many posts inside the café, the café describes itself as ‘public’, with 
many of its newsletters, links, and postings freely available without the need 
to register. The café sends a clear message to politicians through ten demands 
published on its introduction page, including strong border protection, keep-
ing foreign labour out of Korea to stop them from driving down wages and jobs 
for Koreans, punishing and expelling ‘fake’ refugees and illegal immigrants, and 
3 As of 28 June 2020, 7:46 PM. It also goes by the name the People’s First National Action.
4 For more information about how Naver Cafés are ranked, see https://section.cafe.naver.com/
cafe-home/cafes/rankings-introduction/, accessed 28 June 2020.
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calls on politicians to abolish the ‘refugee law’. Other demands revolve around 
abolishing international marriage agencies and eroding the rights of long-term 
foreign residents in Korea.5 It also shares information about its anti-refugee and 
anti-foreigner activities, such as organizing offline demonstrations, articles, 
and organizing offline meetings and rallies as well as creating hateful social 
media content. The café is organized around its main political apprehensions, 
spanning a wide range of issues, such as fine dust, North Korea, multicultural-
ism, illegal immigrants, China, LGBTQI issues, and, most importantly for our 
discussion, the café has a comprehensive section on Islam and Muslims. This 
section is categorized into Anti-Islam Evidence, Islamic Articles, Islamic Video, 
Islamic Information, Islamic Terrorism/Crime, Islamic Supporters, and Muslim 
Support Policy. Much of the content about Yemenis, Muslims, and refugees are 
filed both here and under ‘Refugees/Defectors’ in the sections called Evidence 
Data for Anti-Refugees/Defectors or Refugee/North Korean Defector Articles. 
Figure 2 (above) illustrates the Café’s homepage.
Significantly, the café is a resource for fake and biased news against 
refugees, Muslims, and other vulnerable social minorities. It is a space where 
members share news without fact checking and spread disinformation. It re-
posts and shares news articles from European sources and leans heavily on 
articles that portray refugees in a negative light in the European context to 
justify its own anti-refugee positions. To illustrate, under the café’s sections on 
‘Islam Terror and Crime’ and ‘Refugees’ are reams of news stories tagged ‘Voice 
of Europe’ (approximately 740/750 public articles generated in 2018–2019), 
sharing articles and translated articles from European sources about refugees 
committing rapes and ISIS-related acts of terrorism. Germany and Sweden, in 
particular, caught café members’ attention, as they shared several news sto-
ries related to Swedish women who were allegedly raped by Syrian and Afghan 
5 For the full list of demands, see Café website: https://cafe.naver.com/refugeeout?iframe 
_url=/MyCafeIntro.nhn%3Fclubid=29453879/, accessed 28 June 2020.
Figure 2 Refugee Countermeasures National Action Homepage
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refugees. A keyword search for ‘Sweden’ across the café returned 197–200 
articles published in 2018–2019 and 298–300 for ‘Germany’ for the same period.
Table 4 lists a sample of articles/content obtained from a search on the 
keyword ‘Europe’, illustrating the use of migrants, immigrants, and refugees in 
European contexts as a basis for shaping anti-refugee sentiments in the Korean 
context.
Next, a simple keyword search on ‘Yemeni’ yields hundreds of negative posts 
and articles, some 449–450 open access articles posted in 2018–2019. A sup-
plementary search on ‘Refugee’ returned 4000 articles, with 3950 open access 
articles published in 2018–2019.
In terms of the content, Yemeni refugee issues were strongly connected to 
women’s protection through articles and posts on alleged cases of refugee-
perpetrated rapes. My search yielded 100 articles related to the keyword ‘rape’, 
of which 99 were posted in 2018–2019. To illustrate some of the content in 
greater detail, in one post, members suggested that the media were biased 
towards Yemeni refugees rather than Korean women, especially when Korean 
Table 4 “Europe” keyword search results
Post ID Post title Date
45218 Voice of Europe: A refugee boy who came to 
Sweden to avoid rape of the same sex was accused 
of assault
27 November 2018
44145 Syrian refugee accused of raping a 3-yr old boy  
in Greece
17 November 2018
41478 Refugees who killed and raped a teenage girl in 
Rome
26 October 2018
41365 16-yr old girl raped, suspect, illegal refugees 25 October 2018
41364 Illegal refugees raped a 16-yr old girl 25 October 2018
41358 Rome, 16-yr old girl raped, suspect, illegal refugees 25 October 2018
40459 Displaced in rape substance 19 October 2018
31346 The daughter of a top European executive raped 
by an Afghan Muslim refugee
23 August 2018
24075 Watching a mass rape video, a refugee named 
Povia
2 August 2018
19924 Interpretation of Overseas Articles: Swedish rape 
& refugees/political correctness
25 July 2018
17230 French refugees flock to rape women 21 July 2018
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women were alleged victims of refugee-perpetrated sexual violence. Another 
post questioned whether Yemenis were preparing for civil war in Korea, rais-
ing concerns about ‘Shia terrorists’ within their ranks. Several posts described 
Yemenis as drug abusers, as some asylum seekers were found to have traces 
of khat in their bloodstream when they underwent drug testing as part of the 
refugee application screening process. Although the khat had been consumed 
before they arrived in Korea and although khat is legal in Yemen, stories of 
drug abuse by refugees incited fear and rage amongst café members.
Interestingly, like many other right-wing and white supremacist outlets 
around the world, the café staunchly claims that it is not racist. Instead, it 
pushes the narrative that everyday Koreans are subject to ‘reverse discrimi-
nation’ because foreign labourers are driving down wages, forcing Koreans to 
compete for jobs and because multicultural families formed through ‘interna-
tional marriages’, particularly between immigrant women and Korean men, 
receive ‘preferential treatment’. In general, the café takes a negative view of 
foreigners. However, its opposition to refugees is strongly based on ‘cultural 
differences’, signifying another layer of racism ‘without racism’ as found across 
global far-right discourses. These sentiments are captured in a post shared in 
the café by ‘The Liberal Economist’, Jinwoo Park, which later went viral across 
other SNS platforms:
The most unfortunate thing for those who argue against refugees online 
and offline is that they often make claims based on fake news…. The pres-
ence of a ‘will to live together’ should be the basis for deciding whether 
to accept refugees. Accepting refugees means granting them the right to 
be ‘people of the Republic of Korea’. While the ‘right as a human’ is 
inherently guaranteed, the ‘right as a citizen’ is guaranteed based on 
the country’s constitution and law. In that case, refugees who want to 
become citizens of the Republic of Korea should show a strong will 
to ‘share the values of the Republic of Korea’s founding of a free-market 
economy and free democracy and fulfil the obligations granted by the 
state in due process and justification’. By solidifying this great principle, 
we can effectively explain why we raise our voice against Muslim refu-
gees. Unlike Christianity, which has long been separated from the politics 
of modern free nations, Islam still functions as a political system of mod-
ern Arab countries. Terrorism based on religious beliefs is almost 100% 
Muslim. Leftists cite several clauses of the Quran, the Islamic scripture, 
to emphasize that Islam is a ‘religious religion of peace’, but the Quran 
clearly shows that Muhammad’s deeds have moved from the Mecca era 
of peace and tolerance to the Medina era of violence and politics. There 
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is a stark difference from Christianity, which has transitioned from the 
Old Testament of Violence and Politics to the New Testament of Peace 
and Tolerance. Therefore, it can be concluded that the public’s suspi-
cion that Muslim refugees will not be able to share the founding value 
of the Republic of Korea is extremely reasonable, and that acceptance of 
Muslim refugees should be extremely strict.6
Another post written in the form of an opinion blog is important for our 
discussion:
We are not afraid of Yemenis who come to Jeju, but of their culture. After 
all, it is a cultural invasion, and it is a war. But you feel sorry for them? Did 
we kill them? We will end up dead because of them! Several European 
countries have already proved it. It is time to think about the country and 
its people…. We must banish Yemenis and Muslims. 50 % of Muslims who 
believe in Islam refer to Islam as a religion of peace. But if you believe in 
it 100%, you become ISIS (Islamic extremist).
These posts sum up much of the discourse about refugee issues in South Korea, 
especially as expressed on the Refugee Countermeasures Café: fears about 
Muslims, ‘Islamic’ terrorism, rape/violence against women, and the economy. 
As highlighted by fact checkers at Seoul National University (2018a, 2018b) it 
is also broadly reflective of three influential pieces of fake news that stirred 
up significant hatred for Yemeni refugees: 1. That the government was giving 
substantial financial support to refugee applicants; 2. That the crime rate will 
rise because of Muslim refugees; and 3. That Yemeni refugees on Jeju Island 
could get jobs easily whereas Koreans were unsupported by the government. 
Gender also played a huge role in shaping negative perceptions of Yemenis, 
with many Koreans questioning why their government should support having 
‘strong, healthy’ men settle in their country. Another important dynamic in the 
Korean anti-refugee discourse in 2018 was the appearance of protest slogans: 
‘Not racist, we want safety!’ along with ‘we don’t want to be like Europe’, reflect-
ing this discourse of ‘cultural differences’ (Balibar 1991).
Protestors and café members consistently called on the government to put 
Koreans first, especially prioritizing the rights of Korean women and work-
ers ahead of refugees. This was reflected in my analysis of the group Refugee 
Countermeasures National Action, as they continuously cried ‘Citizens, first!’ 
or even ‘Natives, first!’ – a slogan that also appears on the homepage.
6 https://cafe.naver.com/refugeeout/19773/, accessed 3 July 2020.
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It is true that the Korean government took the unusual step of granting 
Yemenis the right to work whilst awaiting processing. This measure aimed to 
ease social and financial burdens placed on Jeju residents, non-governmental 
organizations, and the asylum seekers, many of whom were reduced to living 
on the streets, as no facilities were put in place to meet their basic needs for 
food and shelter when they first arrived on the Island. However, these Yemenis 
faced severe restrictions on the type of work they were allowed to do, with per-
mission limited to farming, fishing, and similar jobs requiring hard labour to 
filling exist worker shortages. These industries are already staffed by low-paid 
migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia, as Koreans tend to shun this 
type of work. Fake news about these types of ‘financial benefits’ for Yemeni 
asylum seekers started to circulate, adding further fuel to the outpouring of 
rage. Furthermore, it was erroneously said that refugees received financial sup-
port of KRW 1.38 million per month per person, an amount usually available to 
a Korean family of five or more. However, fact checkers at JBTC News (2019) 
later confirmed this as fake news.
As indicated earlier, debates on whether Yemenis were ‘fake’ or ‘real’ refu-
gees stormed across the café, focusing on the fact that the majority of arrivals 
were young male Muslims. Many of these young men escaped forced conscrip-
tion in Yemen before eventually making the long journey to Korea. Focused on 
discrimination based on age, gender, and religion, the anti-refugee discourse 
framed these Yemenis as fake refugees seeking employment opportunities in 
Korea. A report by Hani (2018) revealed the level of hatred for Muslims, par-
ticularly Yemeni refugees, as they unearthed several blogs and other online 
content that framed them as violent and dangerous people capable of raping 
the daughters and daughters-in-law and killing the sons of local residents.
These accusations and negative framing of refugees, particularly male 
Muslim refugees are not unique to Korean society and are connected to a 
long-standing, existing global discourse. The discourse on the anti-refugee 
movement aimed at Syrian refugees who went to Europe in 2015 stressed that 
the refugees were male, actively reducing the visibility and voices of refugee 
women. As suggested by Walker and Gajjala (2016), the heightened visibility 
of men versus women gives a wider message that women have been aban-
doned, affirming that Muslim men are violent in various ways and that Muslim 
women need to be rescued from oppression. Furthermore, the images of male 
refugees, who are well dressed, well spoken, and skilled, with some able to 
afford basic necessities, do not fit the existing images of what a refugee should 
look like in the Western and, by extension, the Korean imagination. Walker and 
Gajjala (2016: 180) remind us that challenging the masculinity of Arab men is 
based on historical, colonial framing that is ‘simultaneously effeminate and 
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threatening to women’. As shown in the next section, these tropes are perpetu-
ated through misrepresentation in online spaces.
7 ‘Secure Safety Rights for Jeju Women’/‘Save Jeju Women’
As mentioned earlier, the trending hashtags ‘Secure Safety Rights for Jeju 
Women’ and ‘Save Jeju Women’ were important indicators of online discourse, 
expressing fears over the presence of male Muslim refugees in Korea.
The post shown in Figure 3 was reported in Hani (2018) after going viral online 
with the tagline ‘Six women missing for a month after receiving refugee status 
from Jeju Island’. Presenting a chilling timeline of the deaths of six women who 
were reported as missing on Jeju Island, the original poster blamed Yemeni 
refugees, holding them responsible as murderers.
The post circulated widely online, especially as the original author 
added the caption: ‘Jeju Island is really dangerous. If you stay still, not only 
Jeju Island but the whole of Korea will be eaten by people disguised as refu-
gees’ (Hani 2018).
However, a police investigation revealed that, in fact, the number of missing 
women was five, of which three had died of illness or drowning. The police fur-
ther confirmed that there were no signs of sexual violence and that the other 
two cases of ‘murder’ were fabricated stories. Furthermore, to stem the flow of 
misinformation online, the Jeju Police released a statement to clarify that the 
viral post linking these incidents to Yemeni refugees was fake. Immediately 
afterwards, fact checkers confirmed that Jeju’s Yemeni refugees were not con-
nected to these tragic deaths (KBS 2018; SNU 2018).
The real-life case of the ‘Missing Jeju Women’ played an essential role 
in the ‘protect women’ discourse as their disappearances and even killings 
were wrongfully attributed to Yemeni arrivals, stirring up considerable hatred, 
to the point that people took to the streets to voice their anger on the mainland 
in Seoul (Shoji, Amnesty International 2018). The demonstrations and overall 
backlash were based on the flawed perception that Muslim men are prone to 
sexual violence, with some of these assumptions rooted in fake and negative 
Figure 3  
‘Jeju’s Missing Women’ viral post reported in (Hani 2018)
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news about refugee sex crimes in Europe. Fake news from Sweden truly cap-
tivated many Korean activists; the unsubstantiated statistic stated that a 1400 
percent increase in sexual assaults was due to an influx of Muslim refugees was 
especially influential. This became a serious source of fear and was investigated 
by JBTC News fact checkers (Oh 2018). It was determined to be fake – a statis-
tic propagated by a right-wing, US-based think tank. Unfortunately, despite 
numerous factchecks, the damage had already been done, as this ‘statistic’ as 
well as news of sexual violence in Germany were widely discussed and cir-
culated in Korean online circles, including Refugee Countermeasures Café, 
spreading fear and hatred towards Yemeni refugees.
The data presented so far present a bird’s-eye view of the key connections 
between women-related concerns and refugee issues. Delving deeper into 
their theoretical connections, it seems clear that a key driver of anti-refugee 
discourse, particularly against Yemeni refugees, was based on neo-colonial, 
Orientalist tropes propagated by an extremely well-organized and power-
ful Protestant far-right movement. According to Nami Kim (2016: 122), ‘the 
chief proponent who breeds Islamophobia in South Korea is the Protestant 
Right’. Kim’s assertion that Islamophobic narratives are constructed on a neo-
colonial foundation in which Korean women need to be rescued from violent 
Muslim men and Islam is extremely valuable for our discussion. In relation 
to this, anti-multicultural discourse, such as the sentiments expressed by 
Refugee Countermeasures National Action, has continuously formed a sense 
of right-wing anxiety around migrant workers as potential sex offenders who 
pose a great risk to Korean women (Jun 2020). Jun further suggests that these 
anxieties, built up over time, were activated at the time of the Yemeni refu-
gee crisis in 2018. This situation enabled Korean women’s bodies to be used as 
way to emphasize patriarchal norms: that women were oppressed, needing to 
be saved from yet another foreign, male threat, and that this time the foreign 
other, Yemeni refugees, were potential oppressors. Jun’s work gives this posi-
tion further legitimacy as she points out that feminist groups, including online 
‘mum café’ members, protested against the refugees based on claims of safety. 
Essentially, Islamophobia shaped by this anti-refugee discourse sheds light 
on several interconnected social issues in South Korean society: racism, dis-
crimination, gender issues, and ethnonationalism. It is also a driving factor in 
producing gendered Islamophobic narratives reflected in hubs of anti-refugee 
activism with the hashtag/slogans ‘Secure Safety Rights for Jeju Women’ and 
‘Jeju Missing Women’, which brings us to a discussion about co-opting feminist 
discourse for nefarious ends. Ferree (2006: 13) asks us to think about ‘how and 
when feminist principles become co-opted in the national interest of either 
liberal modernist states or religious fundamentalism’ Nami Kim (2016) elabo-
rates on this within the Protestant far-right movement, saying that misogyny, 
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sexism, patriarchy, and gendered violence are attributed to Islam but absolve 
Christianity of these behaviours.
Taking a different approach, Kim Bo-Myung (2019) questions the depth of 
feminist understanding within Korean society when feminist language is co-
opted to shape Islamophobic discourse, framing Muslim men as violent and 
the Korean state as the protector of women. In relation to this, Ryu Jinhee 
(2019) signals that the calls to ‘Save Korean Women’ from Muslim men replays 
imperialist narratives of white men saving women from brown men. Unlike in 
the past, this situation plays out in postcolonial Korea, where people of colour 
are calling for the expulsion of Yemenis based on the same colonialist prin-
ciples, echoed in the sources of fake news, and reliance on experiences in the 
European context when it came to handling refugees in 2015.
8 Conclusion
This article analyzes digital data through text mining and digital ethnography 
to offer insights into the connections between anti-refugee discourse, feminist 
discourse ignited by the recent MeToo movement in Korea, and the impact 
of neocolonial narratives mostly from European sources. As highlighted by 
Nguyen (2016), building an understanding of how conflicts over sensitive issues 
are discussed and debated online is useful for clarifying the underlying causes 
of the discourse. In this research, it shows the ways in which two discourses – 
protecting refugees and women’s rights, which are ordinarily expected to be 
on the ‘same side’ – were positioned against each other, depending on horrific 
stories of rape and violence and distorted facts about refugees and migrants 
in European contexts, particularly in 2015. In this way, we can see how online 
media can transform public discourses through information shared across bor-
ders and cultures, even when it has little relevance to the receiving public, and 
supports Nguyen’s view that web spheres are always transnational or global.
By making these critical connections between the production and distri-
bution of anti-refugee discourse particularly through ‘feminist’ concerns, my 
work is not intended to criticize the vital work of women who seek to disman-
tle patriarchy and its systems. Rather, my work explores the tensions between 
calling for one set of rights whilst curtailing another, based on fears caused 
by the digital spread of fake news, anti-refugee sentiments, and global narra-
tives of Islamophobia that are aimed in particular at Muslim men. Because 
of the absence of a significant history of Muslim-perpetrated violence 
towards Korean women, these fears need to be unpacked to reveal the core of 
South Korea’s issues with refugees. Therefore, this article demonstrates 
the impact of European narratives: negative and fake news about refugees, 
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Orientalist tropes and imperialist ‘save women’ discourses in digital and offline 
spaces, and South Korean reactions to its own ‘refugee crisis’ in 2018, focus-
ing on how the anti-refugee discourse was founded on concerns for women’s 
safety.
These online discourses differed across platforms whilst engaging with 
similar issues of Islamophobia, terrorism, economy, fake refugees, and fears of 
sexual violence as channelled through European sources quoted by Refugee 
Countermeasures National Action and fake news stories circulated online. The 
results from my data-mining exercise are enriched by ethnographic observa-
tions, revealing the real ‘crisis’ at the heart of Korea’s reaction to the arrival of 
Yemeni refugees: a series of disconnections between desires for recognition as 
a global power, struggles with the rapid diversity growing in its population, and 
the power of right-wing Christian and anti-multicultural groups as they built 
solidarity with parts of the Korean feminist movement, propagating wide-
spread anti-refugee sentiments with real-life consequences for Yemenis who 
arrived on Jeju Island.
Finally, the circulation of fake news undoubtedly is actively used and re-
used to further anti-refugee and Islamophobic positions. Economic concerns 
expressed through ‘fake versus real’ refugee debates, fears about sexual vio-
lence, and a discourse of cultural differences based on the treatment of women 
vociferously expressed in protests led by Refugee Countermeasures National 
Action, and similar right-wing groups indicate that Korea’s refugee situation 
became a crisis not because of the number of people arriving but because 
it became a microcosm of Korea’s existing social woes. The Yemeni ‘refugee 
crisis’ reveals that Korea as a society is deeply at odds with itself, and one of 
the key theatres of conflict was the Yemeni refugee issue that played out in the 
digital sphere.
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